>>Good morning an welcome to Global Perspectives.

I'm David Dumke.

Toda we are joined by an India expert who has served in high levels in the US government, as well as in numerous think tanks focusing on the US India relationship.

Welcome to the show, Lindsey Ford.

>>Thanks so much for having me, David.

>>So, Lindsey, you were recently quoted in The Economist describing the US India relationship, this relationship you've worked on so closely for two decades as being in a situation where it's something akin to long Covid.

Can you explain what that is and where we are with India?

>>Sure.

Happy to.

Well, it's no surprise to anyone that the last few months in the India relationship have been rocky, to say the least.

The US and India have been trying to conclud a long anticipated trade deal.

And I think for a while folk thought things were going well.

But they hit some real turbulence over the summer.

And then following that President Trump also announced a lot of concern abou Indian imports of Russian oil.

And as a result of all that there was a real breakdown, both in the trade negotiation and in the overall relationship.

Then things turned pretty frosty.

What we're seeing right now, I think, is a renewed effort to put the trade deal back on track and maybe to try to patch up some of the bumpiness of the last few months.

But what I was referencing in The Economist article is a concern that I have, that we may get a trade deal.

We may begin to see senior officials move back and forth again.

And from the outside, it may appear that the US India relationship has gone back to normal.

But then I think that India's surprise and I think frustratio even that a relationship it had seen is so singularly special and important, didn't feel that way anymore in recent months.

That concern and that lack of trust isn't going to evaporate easily.

And I think what you may end up having is a relationship that, from the outside still seems to operate normally, but underneath lack some of the foundational trust that is necessar to actually let us move forward.

>>So you currently serve as a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, but you were in the Biden administration, both National Security Council and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

And you did a lot of work on the security side of the relationship in particular.

How could that be jeopardized right now?

And when we talk about that first, I think it's important for a viewer to understand the context of the growth of the security relationship over the last 15 years or so.

>>Yeah.

So the US and India have been, security partners.

We call each other major defense partners for a while-- >>But not allies.

>>But not allies.

And that and that is important to India is, has a tradition of being nonaligned.

It doesn't have any formal treaty alliances.

That's obviously very different from the relationships the United States has in Europe even with countries like Japan or South Korea, but very close partners.

And that defense relationship has really, moved forward at sort of hyperdrive over the last two decades.

In the year 2000, the US and India had absolutely no defense sales at all.

We now have over $20 billion in U.S.

defense sales.

We have major U.S.

defense platforms being produced in India.

So, for example, we're making, F-16 parts of the F-16 fighter planes in India.

We're making parts of U.S.

military helicopters in India.

And we have an amazingly robust training, relationship.

We have thousands of U.S.

and Indian troops that exercis and train together every year.

We share information we launche under the Biden administration a new defense innovatio initiative, where our militaries are coming together with startup to collaborate on problems like how do we create mor domain awareness, in the ocean.

How do we collaborate on thing like space satellites together?

It's an amazingly robust and innovativ defense relationship right now.

>>On the defense side, you're talking about arms sales as well as developed, joint developed, things.

It's big business.

>>It is big business.

>>Wha what what are we talking about in terms of size?

>>Well, like I said, we've had ove $20 billion right now in, U.S.

defense sales to India.

But I think what is most exciting, but also potentially at risk in this current moment is the future of the relationship.

And where that's going, I think looks much more integrated, what we call co-production in the defense world.

And what that means is, for example, India is producing its own fighters, but we are going to have U.S.

engines in those fighters.

We might have American tanks that are being operated by the Indian military, but India could perhaps produce its own munitions or other kinds of technology that could be integrated into those tanks.

So it's a much more integrated relationship.

And what's exciting about that is it creates the potential not just for defense trade between the U.S.

and India, but also for the U.S.

and India to potentially take the technologies we produce together and export them elsewhere in Asia and in the world.

And what's extremely important about that is it gives countrie in Asia alternatives oftentimes to Chinese and Russian equipment that right now can oftentimes be the only thing that they can afford.

>>The Russian equipment, of course.

You know, you're talking about these increased arms sales and it's very dynamic growth in that that's that sector.

But what percentage of the Indian military inventory is of Russian origin still to this day?

>>It has declined significantly, in the last two decades.

And so Russia remains the largest source of arms imports for India.

But the numbers look different across services.

In the past, it was something like 90% of Indian arms exports were coming from Russia.

For some of the Indian services, if you look in the last five years in particular, very small, down to something like 30%.

But again, it sort of varies across across the Indian military, but I think the overall trajectory has gone down.

And the invers is that Indian imports of U.S., but also European systems have gone up significantly in the same timeframe.

>>So, Lindsey, when we're talking about national security, I want to also ask about the quad, which is which is a alliance which may not be a formal alliance, but it but India and the US are participating I'll let you explain a little about that, but I want, want to ask specifically, how does Washington view the quad as opposed to how India views views the quad?

>>Sure.

So the quad is an arrangement between the United States, Australia, Japan and India.

And it really came togethe out of the Indian Ocean tsunami that happened back in the early 2000s, where those countries were working together, on disaster relief and responding to a lot of humanitarian, challenges that came out of the tsunami.

And since then, the quad ha become a much more robust forum.

We meet, at the leaders level now every year, but also work on everything ranging from cyberspace to maritime operations and during the pandemic, on Covid relief, as well.

I don't actually thin that the United States and India are all that misaligned on how we see the quad.

The value of the quad is that it is the four democracies in Asi with the most size and capacity to be able to deliver public goods for the rest of the Asian region.

That has really been the driving premise of the quad.

And I think in a lot of ways, the quad has delivered on that promise.

So, as I said, a lot of work delivering, vaccines during Covid, a lot of work offering free satellite data, to other countries in Asia, and then a lot of work on digital infrastructure, and cyber capabilities and training for other countries in Asia.

That's really what the quad has been about.

And I think that what's important is it sends a message, frankly, that democracy can deliver.

And I think right now, when a lot of countries in the world question whether that is still true, that is an incredibly powerful and important message for those four countries, to really stand up for together.

>>China of course, is in the background when you're talking about the quad of kind of is this this alliance or this, this connection, this relationship of democracies.

Is it meant to contain China or how does it work for and against China?

>>So I think what you would find leaders of quad countries would tell you is this is not an inherently anti-China grouping.

That the purpose of the quad is, again, about how those countries can deliver for the rest of the region.

Now, I think the view from Beijing is probably, that regardless of that, i is all about containing China.

And in a sense, if you se a zero sum relationship between an auth - an authoritarian model and a democratic model, I can maybe understan why that is their perspective.

But I think that is not the view of the quad countries who feel, you know, we are going to focus on doing what we can to make the broader region, safer and more secure and more prosperous.

And that's that's what the work of the quad is focused on.

However, there is obviously a contest, between a democratic model and an authoritarian model for the kinds of rules that you would like to see taking place in Asia.

And I think it's hard to ignore that.

And, and in that sense, you know, while the quad is not anti-China, I think it is important that it is putting an alternative on offer.

>>So I want to ask too, we're talking about India an kind of its place in the world.

And of course we're talking about the quad.

But India just recently had a clash with Pakistan.

They've had border conflicts with China periodically.

And that border is always considered relatively warm if not hot.

How does India see itself managing these relationships, especially when you have a situation with Chin having its own calculations, how it sees the quad, for example, how it may see Pakistan?

>>I think that the big concern for India right now, the the really sort of, the worry that wakes you up at 3:00 in the morning kind of concern is that they have two challenging situations along their border with both China and Pakistan, and that increasingly it is possible that you could see collaboration between those two countries in a way that India could be facing a two front crisis.

So in May, we saw another round, of hostilities between India and Pakistan in the west.

In 2020, we saw similar hostilities between China and India on the east.

But China and Pakistan have an incredibly close partnership, a partnership that is actually quite unique in the range of militar relationships that Beijing has with other countries.

They've been very clear in public statements that Pakistan is special.

All weather friends is what they call each other.

They do things together militarily that China does with few other countries.

And so the fear for India is that were there to be a crisis with Pakistan, might Pakistan look to Chin to create trouble on its border or out in the Indian Ocea at the same time, or vice versa?

Might China have a conflict with India?

And could they sort of tag Pakistan i to create problems in the West?

India is the only country in the world that has two large nuclear armed neighbors with whom it has active disputes.

That is an incredibly perilous situation for Delhi, and even more problematic when both of those two countries are working together.

>>Whe you look at Pakistan, of course, which is talked about in the context of the Chin relationship and how that poses a threat on two fronts for, for for India.

And you also have the issue of Kashmir that's been out there with Pakistan.

But one of the biggest threat, it seems, would be just Pakistani instability right on the border as a nuclear power, as one with a shared history in many ways and a lot of tension in that, that history.

But it's almost, it seems like a threat that's always there of a collapse of the Pakistani government.

What that could mean for India.

>>I think what it would mea not just for India, but frankly, for countries across the region and the United States.

Pakistan has ongoing problems domestically, with various extremist groups that operate in the country.

There are parts of Pakista that have, frankly, been fairly permissible for those groups to operate relatively freely.

That has cause a lot of problems for Pakistan.

And indeed in the last few years, Pakistan has seen a lot of extremist violence, increase in various areas, even attacks on its own military.

The concern for India, the concern for the United States for a long time has been that those groups, the impac could spill over to other areas.

And that's why for the United States, it has, you know, quietly worked for, for decades to try to have some kind of relationship with Pakistan where we could help them with things that would keep a lid on that extremist problem.

India has not always love that the United States has had, you know, a relationshi with Pakistan on those things.

But I think, you know, understands an I think most countries recognize when we look back to somethin like 9/11, it is not impossible for, you know, groups that are not even that technologically sophisticate to nonetheless, have designs on terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world, and that it is far bette to help Pakistan keep a lid on and, you know, take care of those groups at home.

Then run the risk that you could, again, have groups with a greater ability to execute attacks elsewhere in the world.

>>I wanted to ask you, just turning a little away from specific problems.

I want to look at how does India see itself both as a country in Asia, a power in Asia, and as a and its place in the globe?

>>Well, I think, you know, India has a history of being a great empire.

And I think in, a lot of ways, India still sees itself as a country that should not only be a leading power in Asia, but should be a leading global power.

Certainly, the Modi administration, I think, has shown a lot more confidence that this is a moment in time in which India is willing and able to step forward on the global stage in a way that it hasn't in the past.

So we have seen India much more actively engaging countries in Southeast Asia now engaging countries in Latin America.

We have seen India talking about things like its concern about Arctic security, and very actively lobbyin for things like a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

All of this, I think, reflects that, in the minds of the Modi administration, India's rightful place is to be a global leading democratic power, and it intends to step into that role.

Is that compatibl with its tradition of being part of, you know, the leader of the nonaligned movement, for example, and not wanting formal alliances?

>>Well, I think from India's perspective, it certainly is.

Though, you see I think some shifts in the way that India talks about alignment.

So in the Cold War, India talked a lot about non-alignment.

Today what you hear Indian leaders talking about is multi alignment.

And that's maybe a subtle shift.

But I think what it means is India recognizes it is going to have to have close partnerships with other countries, whether that's the United States, whether that's France, whether that's countries in the Middle East, like the UAE.

It recognizes that it is actively building those partnerships.

So while it will not have formal treaty alliances, while it does not want to be put in a position where it has to choose only one partnership over the others, it wants a degree of flexibility.

It nonetheless recognize that it's a complicated world.

It's a difficult world.

And for India to continue to increase its economic and political power, its got to have friends.

>>So explain a little about the the recent we won't say rupture, but let's just say the tension that's developed between the US and India.

We started with the discussio about long Covid, but there are some very specific, consequences of that tension.

Already.

One is you see Washington growing closer to Pakistan, at least on the surface.

You see, most more ominou for India is the imposition of excessive tariffs on Indian products, which seems to be a surprise.

And that was was was justified on the basis of India's relationship with Russia in terms of receiving oil.

How does how was this a shock to to India?

>>I think the conversation about Russian oil was a bit of a shock because frankly, thus far in the Trump administration, they had been having a lot of back and forth conversation about, about trade.

But at least for the first few months of the Trump administration, it had actually seemed like maybe the United States was going to have a better relationship with Russia than it had in the past, not a worse one.

So I think to suddenly sort of be in the firing line over Indian purchases of Russian oil did catch folks in Delhi by surprise.

Now, to be fair, India has, over the last few years, fairly dramatically increased its purchases of Russian oil.

Now what Indian leaders are saying is, well, one, it was cheap and we have dramatic energy needs.

So this isn't about which country we like more.

We're just making hard nosed calculations about how we get cheap energy for our country.

Two, they have argued, that doing so actually stabilized global energy markets.

Now, I think the US and India probably have differen perspectives on on all of this.

And I don't know tha that debate's going to go away anytime soon.

What I would say though, is I think if you look at the last month or two tha there are signs that, you know, Indian purchases of Russian oil, maybe are going down a bit.

And I expect that as the Trump administration and India work through the trade agreement and all of these issues, they will find a way, to manage that problem.

India has supply relationships with a lot of countries around the world.

And I don't know that that's a problem that's not solvable for them.

>>What is the status of the US-India new trade agreement that you've been talking about that's been discussed for so long, and there's various negotiations going on.

This is before the tariff announcement.

Will that trade agreement happen and what's in it?

>>Oh, well that's a question that we would all like to know very much.

I won't be breaking any, you know, big, big news here today.

What I would sa is that the talks are ongoing.

There have been recent conversations again between US and Indian trade negotiators, which is very good, because in the summer, there were planned talks that essentially fell apart and didn't happen.

When this dispute kind of blew up between the US and India.

So they were working hard on it.

When it gets concluded, no one knows.

India is due to host the quad leaders sometime in the next several months.

My strong suspicion is, leaders visits have a way of focusing the mind of your staff on getting to the end game and the problems you're facing.

So I suspect they will be working very hard to conclude that, in the near future.

We don't know all the details of what's in there.

The hang up thus far has been over some disputes around agriculture, which is everyone knows-- >>Dairy.

>>Dairy.

And, genetically modified foods.

Agriculture is often a sticking point when it comes to trade agreements, not just with India, but with multiple countries.

It's very sensitive politically for us in the US, too.

But I think it is reassuring that negotiators, are once agai trying to see if they can find a way to find a compromise that works for everyone.

>>Ho difficult - you've you've been privy to negotiations on the defense side, I'm assuming from your your your positions.

India.

And we're talking about trade generally.

India has it has in fact been very protectionist in their their economic.

So it's a very closed economy.

And it was not particularl receptive to free trade before, Modi and his immediate predecessors have eased that over time.

But is the market still open in India or is it still too many restrictions?

>>You know, I think it varies by sector.

There are some areas where, I think the Modi government has recognized that to be competitive they were going to have to allow much more, you know, foreign access than they had in the past.

But broadl speaking, India is still fairly protectionis in terms of its market access.

And while, you know, I may differ on various fronts in in sort of how these trade negotiations have shaken out, I think that if you tal to a lot of American companies, they would say, well we would like a larger presence in India than we have right now, but it hasn' been economically viable for us.

And so I think it is fair to say that we would like India to reduce some of the tariff and non-tariff barriers that American companies have been facing for a long time.

And I frankly think it is India's interest to find a way to do so because for its own economic growth, having US and other international multinationals feel that Indi is a more friendly environment for investment and business is absolutely going to be necessary when you look at a country that has an enormous and quite young population that really needs to see pretty high levels of economic growth over the next few decades.

>>So I want to ask, how optimistic are you?

So this is we're talking abou going back 20 years and you've you've seen spectacular growth in almost all aspects of the U.S.

Indian relationship.

How much potential for growth do you see on the horizon?

This is obviously the most populous country in the world at this point, a huge market a player that hasn't really had a global role in a certain sense.

It's been kind of it's a player, but not not.

It hasn't been a super active player.

Where is this relationship going on?

Are you positive about are you cautious?

>>I' always optimistic about the U.S.

and India relationship, not because it hasn't been bumpy and difficult at various points along the way.

And I expect we'll continue to have moments like that.

But because when I think when you look a the overall direction of travel in the last two decades, despite ups and downs, this is a relationship that has continued to grow and become more integrated.

And I think that, you know, one of the things that makes this relationship so unique and gives me a lot of optimism, is the tremendous people to people ties between the United States and India.

This is a very larg Indian-American population right here, in, in Orlando, in places like New Jersey, California, Texas.

I mean, there are over 5 million Indian-Americans in the United States.

Indian students are the largest, group of foreign students who come and study in U.S.

universities.

And I think that, you know, if you'd asked a lot of Indian leaders, you know, where do you want your kids to go to school?

They would have said in the United States, right, right here.

And those ties are strong.

And I think that makes the relationshi more resilient to some of the, you know, twists and turns that may happen politically.

And on the policy front.

And I think in a lot of ways, it makes our future really intertwined.

And so we have to cooperate more closely.

>>One final question, because we're running out of time.

A lot of this growth is come under, during during the time prime Minister Modi has been in office.

But democracy of course, you have change of leadership and that can change policies rather abruptly.

And we've seen some of that.

The Trump administration's orientation is definitely very different than what you experienced in the Biden administration.

Could you see India changing policies abruptly because of democratic forces within the country?

If you have a leadership change?

>>I think that's always possible.

I mean, it's possible in India in the same way that obviously India is experiencing it right now in the United States.

It's one of the reasons why I think really fostering those grassroots level tie between our countries, fostering the private sector, busines level ties between our countries is so important because those are the things that-- >>They're enduring.

>>They are they carry you through the hard moments.

And and I think, you know, we need to focus on that because political leaders wil come and go, they will change.

That is a part of life.

But that's the thing that I think sort of binds us by a sense of shared community and shared values between our countries.

>>Lindsey Ford, thank you so much for joining us today.

It's a fascinating relationship to to look at and thank you for your service and work on it.

>>Thank so much, David, for having me.

>>And thank you for joining us.

We'll see you again next week on another episode of Global Perspectives.